Rouhani in New York; is something going to happen?

Rouhani's attendance at the UN General Assembly has fueled speculation about the outcome of the trip. Many are asking whether the regime sent Rouhani to New York with a serious motive to reduce tensions with the United States? How much backtracking is Trump willing to make?

In recent days, Iranian and international media have been speculating about Hassan Rouhani's trip to New York to attend the 74th UN General Assembly. Rather than focusing on Hassan Rouhani's recent speech in which he talked about the "Hormuz Peace Initiative," attention has been focused on Mohammad Javad Zarif's numerous interviews with various American media outlets, especially the points he made in an interview with veteran CNN anchor Christiane Amanpour.

Ms. Amanpour tweeted, quoting Zarif: “Rouhani is willing to meet with Trump on condition that Trump creates conditions for lifting all sanctions in exchange for comprehensive inspection (of Iran’s nuclear facility).” In explaining this tweet, Mohammad Javad Zarif wrote that his proposal was for the Iranian parliament to accept the Additional Protocol “in exchange for lifting the sanctions by the US House.”

He also explained to Site Alef that “Iran has proposed (faster implementation of) two reciprocal commitments for 2023 in the JCPOA.” Zarif also said in an interview with Amanpour that “if the commitment is immediately implemented by the United States, a meeting will take place within the 5+1 framework.”

“On the verge of a very bad deal”?

Araqchi's remarks to the Independent newspaper also attracted media attention, when he said: "If Trump returns to the nuclear deal, we will meet with the US within the framework of the 5+1 meeting." Meanwhile, another comment attracted attention: the tweet of Rouhani's advisor Hesameddin Ashena: "The president is on the verge of carrying out a difficult mission on behalf of the Iranian nation."

Where does the difficulty of Rouhani’s mission come from? What is this mission and how likely is it to succeed? Aren’t some positive signals in Zarif and Rouhani’s statements rendered ineffective by the statements and positions of the hard core of power? Ebrahim Raisi, the head of the judiciary, said shortly after Zarif’s remarks: “The strategy is resistance and there will be no negotiations at any level.” And Mehdi Mohammadi, who is known among the fundamentalist spectrum as a nuclear expert and is not unaware of the discussions and analyses behind the scenes of the hard core of power, wrote on Twitter: “We are on the verge of a very bad agreement; unless Mr. Rouhani has learned something from the JCPOA experience.”

Thus, the mission mentioned by Rouhani's advisor resembles an equation with several unknowns, in the opinion of experts, on one end are the Supreme Leader's House and the Revolutionary Guards, and the core of power in Iran, which have so far been staunchly opposed to negotiations with the United States, and especially the Trump administration. On the other end of the equation is US President Donald Trump and the policy-making institutions in this country, who also do not necessarily all speak the same language.

Is Trump backing down?

But how much hope does Trump's behavior so far give the Islamic Republic? He has shown that the United States is not seeking a military option against Iran and may not seek to engage in the Middle East in the future. But at the same time, he has increased the intensity of pressure on Iran. Sanctions on the Central Bank were one of the last of America's maximum pressure. But how much the tightening of sanctions will work in the short term and make the core of power in the Islamic Republic flexible is still a question. Is Trump's motivation to stand in front of the cameras of reporters with Hassan Rouhani strong enough to be willing to respond positively to the message of the Iranian Foreign Minister and take a step back?

If Trump really backs down and lifts at least some of the sanctions, will Ayatollah Khamenei give Rouhani the green light to exchange a few more sentences with Trump, say, at the corner of a UN corridor, than he did with Obama on the phone? Is the faction that holds power in Iran even willing to give the Rouhani government the initiative to start a dialogue with the US?

In addition to these, other questions arise. If Western countries unanimously agree that Iran is responsible for the attack on Aramco facilities, then how much can the Iranian president and his foreign minister maneuver at the United Nations with the slogan "Peace in Hormuz"? So far, along with the United States and Saudi Arabia and some analysts in Germany, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has officially announced that there is a high degree of probability that Iran is responsible for the attack.

An opportunity that will be missed?

French President Emmanuel Macron, while not directly blaming Iran, has said that the September 14 attack on Saudi oil facilities has further destabilized the region and not only has not helped the meeting between the leaders of Iran and the United States, but has “made things worse.” However, he has taken the initiative to “resolve” the crisis between Iran and the United States, expressing hope that “something might happen.” He is pursuing intensive talks separately with Trump and Rouhani.

Regarding his activities in New York, Hassan Rouhani has said that he intends to hold a “meeting at the level of foreign ministers between Iran and the 4+1 countries to discuss “nuclear issues and reducing JCPOA commitments.” He also plans to give several speeches and interviews with major American media outlets. Meetings with the UN Secretary-General and the heads of state of France, Britain, Japan, Switzerland, Spain, Iraq, Sweden, and Pakistan are also among his plans.

Will the world witness the initiative and flexibility of Iran and the United States in these meetings and interviews to reduce tensions and achieve a minimum of their agreements? Or will it be an opportunity that will be wasted like previous opportunities?

Source: DW