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Revolutionary Guard Commander Admits to Intelligence Infiltration at Highest Levels of Government

Mohammad Jafar Asadi, a commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and former deputy inspector of the Khatam al-Anbia Central Headquarters, has acknowledged intelligence infiltration within the Guard, the Ministry of Intelligence, state radio and television, and other government institutions, stating that there is no longer anywhere to hide. These statements, combined with Abbas Araghchi’s previous admission of a security breach at the highest levels of government and reports of Israel’s use of Tehran’s surveillance cameras, paint a picture of structural vulnerability in the Islamic Republic’s security apparatus.

In an interview with Defense Press news agency, Asadi said: “Enemy infiltration has occurred at high levels. There is infiltration even within the Guard, the Ministry of Intelligence, state radio and television, and various government agencies. This infiltration is sometimes direct and sometimes indirect.” An apparatus that has monitored citizens for years has now, according to this Guard official, become incapable of even protecting information and security within the power structure itself.

He also claimed that Israel can use its infiltration in European countries to procure passports and identity documents for its agents so they can enter Iran under the cover of tourists or businessmen.

These statements are far more than a routine security warning. When someone with a command background in the Guard speaks of infiltration within institutions that form a significant part of the Islamic Republic’s military, intelligence, and propaganda structure, the fundamental question becomes: how has an apparatus with this level of budget, personnel, equipment, and security claims become so vulnerable to infiltration? If this infiltration exists at the highest levels, who bears responsibility, and who should be held accountable for these security failures?

Asadi’s statements come as Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, spoke on the 28th of Tir 1405 (June 2026) in an interview about the 40-day war, mentioning a security breach within the Pasteur complex. Araghchi, referring to American and Israeli knowledge of important meetings on the 9th of Esfand 1404 (February 28, 2026), the first day of the war, said this indicated a security breach that likely still has not been resolved. He even suggested the scope of this infiltration extends beyond access to information and may have affected the government’s decision-making and psychological atmosphere.

Previously, the New York Times reported that an operation resulting in the death of Ali Khamenei and several senior Islamic Republic officials was the result of months of intelligence gathering and close cooperation between the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Mossad. According to this report, information about Khamenei’s whereabouts and meetings of senior officials was provided to Israel and played a determining role in planning the operation.

The sum of these reports raises serious questions about the Islamic Republic’s intelligence protection structure: How was the location of the highest government official and sensitive military and security meetings so easily traceable? Was the problem only the infiltration of human agents, or did weaknesses in communication systems, digital infrastructure, and surveillance networks also play a role in this failure?

One notable aspect of Asadi’s statements was his reference to mobile phones, cameras installed on streets, in shops and even homes, as well as information recorded in various systems. He said camera images are analyzed using artificial intelligence, and information about refueling, receiving services, and purchasing airplane tickets makes it possible to track individuals. Asadi concluded: “We ourselves are providing services and information, and it can no longer be said that there is anywhere to hide.”

However, this admission has another dimension: the Islamic Republic has spent years developing these same tools to surveil citizens, identify opponents, control women, and suppress protests. Now the same infrastructure that was supposed to be the government’s eye on the people’s lives has, according to published reports, become a security vulnerability for the government itself.

The Financial Times, in a report published on the 18th of Khordad 1405 (June 8, 2026), wrote that the Islamic Republic installed new cameras during the December 2025 protests to increase surveillance of protesters. According to an informed source, Israel was able during the recent war to access images from these cameras and used them to identify Basij forces stationed at checkpoints. Other reports have also indicated Israel’s informational access to Tehran’s traffic camera network and its use of data analysis to track senior officials and their bodyguards.

This contradiction cannot be overlooked: a government that installs cameras and surveillance systems to control citizens and collects information about people’s movements and daily lives has apparently been unable to keep the same infrastructure secure from foreign infiltration and access. Citizens must bear the cost of constant surveillance by losing their privacy, yet the government cannot even guarantee that collected information will not fall into unknown hands or be misused.

In another part of the interview, Asadi claimed that a Guard member was kidnapped after his head was covered and taken to a house from which direct contact was established with Tel Aviv. According to his account, this person was blindfolded after interrogation and transferred to deserts around Varamin and threatened that if he moved within two hours, he would be shot. Asadi said the Guard member began screaming after about 10 to 15 minutes and finally managed to save himself.

However, Asadi provided no name, date, identity of the kidnappers, or any independent evidence to verify this account. Therefore, this part of his statements should be understood as the testimony of a former Guard official rather than an event whose details have been independently confirmed.

That said, previous reports about the interrogation of individuals connected to the Guard inside Iran have been published. In Ordibehesht 1401 (April-May 2022), Israeli media reported on the interrogation of Mansour Rasuli in Iran; Iran International identified him as being connected to a Guard-affiliated network that, according to this media outlet, was responsible for assassination missions against individuals in Turkey, Germany, and France. The narrative of this case was accompanied by different reactions and accounts from Rasuli himself, and details varied in different media outlets.

In Tir of the same year, Iran International reported on the interrogation of Yedollah Khodmati, associated with the Guard’s Amad and Support Division, claiming that he provided information during interrogation about weapons transfers to Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. News of Khodmati’s interrogation was later confirmed by official Islamic Republic media outlets, though authorities presented a different narrative about the identity and nature of the kidnappers.

Asadi’s admissions are not only about Israeli intelligence infiltration; these statements reveal a deep rift between the government’s security claims and the actual performance of its apparatus. The Islamic Republic has increasingly restricted citizens’ privacy in recent years through expanding surveillance cameras, identification systems, communication controls, and citizen data collection. Yet now a former senior Guard official says information from these same systems may be in others’ hands, and there is no longer any safe place to hide.

Under such circumstances, rather than citizens being held responsible for the government’s security weaknesses or facing even greater restrictions in daily life, officials should explain the heavy costs of this structure, the intelligence failures, and the fate of citizens’ private data. National security cannot be used as a pretext for unlimited surveillance of society while the same government faces repeated failures in protecting its most sensitive centers and information.

When the government expects citizens to register all their information and life details in systems under its control, it has the right to be held accountable for the security of this data; but first and foremost, the government itself must answer this question: how has an apparatus claiming to control everything failed to prevent infiltration at the most sensitive layers of power?

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