Change in Iran could change the Middle East
The following article is a translation and summary of an article published in The Economist magazine, London, on October 3.
The issue of change in Iran, which could transform the Middle East, could weaken militant groups across the region or trigger conflict and a wave of refugees.
In 1985, a young Lebanese group called Hezbollah issued its manifesto. “Party of God,” as its name means in Arabic, it promised to fight Israel and the West and called on its compatriots to establish an Islamic state.
Many Lebanese thought it would be a passing fad. Almost 40 years later, it is the country's most powerful militia, better equipped than even the army. It is a key to Lebanese politics.
Hezbollah has been the most successful example of Iranian influence across the Middle East. Since 1979, the region has been shaped by conflict with Saudi Arabia. Iran saw many reasons to befriend regimes and foster proxy militias. It hoped to expand its Islamic revolution and act as a defender of its Shiite Muslim co-religionists. It also sought a form of strategic depth.
Some of its leaders felt a degree of Persian chauvinism towards Arabs, especially those in the Persian Gulf.
The Gulf states, for their part, have tried to push back. In the 1980s, they supported Saddam Hussein’s war on Iran (he thanked them shortly after by invading Kuwait). They have tried to bolster their allies in places like Lebanon, often with little success. The late King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia called the Iranian regime “a scumbag.” The Gulf states are certainly hoping for regime change to reshape the region’s geopolitics.
Saudi-backed news channels have covered the protests with panache: even small demonstrations in provincial cities deserve sensational coverage. Iran’s allies, on the other hand, are nervous. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has derided the recent protests in Iran as a foreign plot. Yet it is difficult to predict how Iran might be different. The first question raised in Gulf circles is what kind of government will replace Rouhani’s. If a military regime, possibly led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, were to maintain its support for regional proxies, if not for ideological reasons, then for strategic ones. By contrast, a democratic government could temper Iran’s ambitions. Some Iranian protesters have chanted slogans like “No to Gaza, no to Lebanon,” demonstrating hostility to the wasteful spending of billions of dollars abroad on ruthless dictators and militias. But if the ruling ayatollahs were to fall, their regional proxies would not disappear. Hezbollah, even if cut off from its Iranian backers, would remain Lebanon’s most powerful force. It continues to be subsidized by wealthy backers and illegal businesses. It also continues to be supported by many Lebanese Shiites, who see it as a bulwark against Israel and a voice for a repressed sect.
The Houthis, a Shiite rebel group that controls much of Yemen, have grown closer to Iran during a nearly eight-year war against a Saudi-led coalition. But they are not just a pawn: They emerged as a local insurgency in the 1990s; although they have dwindled, they continue to fight. In Iraq, pro-Iranian factions often compete with other Shiite groups not over ideology but over access to the state’s oil wealth. They could end up fighting each other, regardless of the nature of the regime in Tehran.
The biggest change may come in Syria. Bashar al-Assad relied on Iranian support to survive a long civil war, but he has no ideological affinity with the ayatollahs. He has tried to balance Iran with Russia.
The invasion of Ukraine has made this even more difficult: Russia has withdrawn some of its forces from Syria, because they are needed elsewhere.
If Assad could not count on Russian or Iranian support, he would be forced to seek new friends. He is trying to restore relations with the Gulf states, which eagerly supported the rebels who tried to overthrow him. Earlier this year he visited the United Arab Emirates, his first trip to an Arab country in a decade. He would be even more eager to seek Arab friendship if he lost his Iranian patron.
The Gulf states had territorial and political disputes with the Shah of Iran before the fall of the Shah in 1979, but they found a solution with one of the oil-exporting monarchs. A more normal regime in Tehran could allow for greater trade and investment across the Gulf and could force Arab monarchies to reduce their huge military spending. But that depends on limiting Iran’s support for groups like the Houthis and militias in Iraq. The same goes for Israel, which had friendly relations with the Shah’s Iran. It could have them again, but only if Iran curbs its nuclear program and stops supporting groups like Islamic Jihad in Gaza.
Some Iranians fear that the uprising in their country will not end in democracy or even a stable military regime, but rather something like Syria: a failed state that has collapsed from within. If that happens, Iran’s role could be reversed. Instead of leading proxy forces across the region, it could find itself a playground for foreign powers.
Turkey has occupied parts of Syria to push Kurdish fighters away from the border and periodically strikes Kurdish targets there and in Iraq. It may do the same in unstable Iran. Meanwhile, the Gulf states can finance and equip ethnic Arab separatists in southwestern Iran. For now, the Gulf is enjoying the Iranian regime’s discomfort. The government that has caused so much chaos across the region is now facing its own government at home. But turmoil in Iran could have dire consequences elsewhere. The Gulf states could look like easy pits for Iranian defectors, and the clerical regime could still call on its proxies to attack: Take us down, and we’ll take our neighbors down.
