Vienna Talks Halted; IRGC Within or Beyond JCPOA

Vienna talks have stalled following the outbreak of the Ukraine war. It remains unclear whether the eighth round of negotiations should be considered concluded with a ninth round to follow, or if the eighth round will resume from where it stopped. Initially, Russia’s change of position hindered what was considered an accessible final agreement. However, it was clear even then that the governments of Iran and the United States had not yet reached understanding on several key positions. Despite Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian’s meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow, where it was announced that Russia had no preconditions different from JCPOA provisions should an agreement be reached in Vienna, the 1+4 bloc has essentially held no meetings since then. Of course, in the latest round of talks, Enrique Mora, deputy for foreign policy of the European Union, announced that negotiations have concluded and return to the JCPOA requires political decision-making in Tehran and Washington D.C.

Josep Borrell, head of European Union foreign policy, subsequently announced that an agreement, despite reduced differences, remains out of reach. Representatives of the U.S. government presented a relatively more pessimistic assessment, expressing lack of optimism about reaching an agreement on JCPOA reconstruction. Iranian officials, in turn, view the U.S. government as an obstacle to reaching an agreement. Amir-Abdollahian claims that an understanding has been reached among Iranian, European troika, Russian, and Chinese governments on the terms of return to the JCPOA. He claims the U.S. government has posed additional demands that he considers unacceptable. He again stated that the condition for direct negotiations with America is proving good faith by unfreezing some of Iran’s blocked financial assets before reviving the JCPOA; a request that has not received a positive response since the thirteenth government took office.

There have been claims about a deal between Iranian and U.S. governments on prisoner exchanges, in which some frozen financial resources in foreign banks—though not substantial sums—are to be released. However, sources close to the U.S. government denied this claim. Ebrahim Raisi, the system’s president, also announced that the Iranian government “will not abandon its nuclear rights and atomic activities, and is not seeking to halt negotiations.” He also stated that nuclear policy is the declared strategy of Khamenei and considers nuclear negotiations one of the topics of foreign policy.

Two hundred fifty parliament members also wrote a letter supporting the positions of the thirteenth government’s nuclear negotiating team, demanding assurances such as “ensuring legal guarantees from the U.S. government for actual sanctions removal and non-withdrawal from the JCPOA and its approval by the U.S. Congress,” “use of all blocked resources without limitation,” “free trade relations with the world and unlimited foreign investment attraction,” “no imposition of new sanctions by the U.S. government after JCPOA revival,” and “assurance against activation of the snapback mechanism in the future.” Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, parliament speaker, while defending the eleventh parliament’s bill on the “Strategic Action Plan to Preserve Nuclear Rights,” claimed this law “unlocked the nuclear industry’s lock.” He sought an agreement that would bring “economic benefit” to the people. Amir-Abdollahian and Ali Bagheri, head of Iran’s negotiating team, also met with parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission. According to Mahmoud Abbaszadeh Meshkini, the commission’s spokesman: “Members were convinced that in Vienna negotiations, no breach of red lines and national interests has occurred.”

Although parliament has no special and determining role in the decision-making structure of indirect negotiations with the U.S. government, and some demands are also rhetorical and unrealistic, this statement is a window to understanding existing obstacles. The interesting point is that despite the positioning of U.S. government and military officials on the necessity of keeping the Quds Force on the country’s terrorist organization list, this issue was not specifically and explicitly addressed in parliament members’ letter. This statement, alongside the controversial positions of Amir-Abdollahian regarding IRGC officials’ statements that they do not wish to be an obstacle to JCPOA reconstruction, confirms the hypothesis that although the Islamic Republic of Iran makes all efforts to have the IRGC completely excluded from sanctions, it does not tie the fate of JCPOA reconstruction and exit from the current heavy economic bottleneck to it. The system’s reliance in this regard is the absence of effective deterrents against America’s unilateral sanctions vis-à-vis regional interventions and the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities.

On the other hand, the Biden administration has shown a firm position against flexibility regarding the IRGC. Sanctioning the IRGC in 2019 by the Trump administration was a controversial decision that had opponents within the government and among Republicans. The Islamic Republic, despite threats from Mohammad Ali Jafari, former IRGC commander, did not show strong reaction and at the same time did not yield to pressure on the IRGC.

In the subsequent course of the past decade, the IRGC’s position has had relative growth based on field equations in the Middle East and simultaneously has faced new challenges in Lebanon and Iraq. Moreover, its demands in Yemen, which is actually the executive tool of the institution of the Supreme Leader, were not realized in negotiations with Saudi Arabia and consequently increased tension levels. The system’s deterrence policy against the Israeli government’s aggressive approach has also changed, transforming from a non-accelerative and defensive state to more painful and nearly direct confrontations.

Under these circumstances, the system’s priority is the normalization of the IRGC after JCPOA revival. However, the seventh and eighth rounds of Vienna negotiations have definitively shown to the Raisi government and at a higher level to Khamenei that this demand is not feasible. Furthermore, the Biden administration has demands beyond the JCPOA regarding changing IRGC behavior in the region, with the JCPOA serving as a prelude to an agreement on other areas of disagreement while considering Israel’s concerns and the bloc aligned with Saudi Arabia in Arab countries. The Islamic Republic has not accepted this demand, which actually constitutes the main lock to returning to the JCPOA.

What appears to be an irreducible red line for the system is a negative response to demands beyond the JCPOA, particularly in limiting the IRGC’s extraterritorial scope of action. However, standing firm on this also depends on the extent to which the Biden administration insists on its demand and the extent to which the Islamic Republic has resilience regarding the dangers of continued heavy sanctions. The Ukraine war has weakened Russia’s position as an ally of the Islamic Republic in global relations. Hope that Russia can manage crises in its foreign policy is a long-term matter that does not serve addressing the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current needs.

The U.S. government has created differentiation between the IRGC and the Quds Force and conveyed the message that under certain conditions (adjustment and change of IRGC behavior in the region), it is willing to keep the Quds Force on the terrorist organization list but remove the IRGC itself from it. Additionally, only part of IRGC sanctions would be lifted, not all of them. The immutability of U.S. government policy and the passage of time work against the Islamic Republic, and concern that the Biden administration and its European allies might proceed to activate “Plan B” by setting aside the JCPOA has limited the system’s cards and its bargaining power. Of course, the Biden administration, considering the changing international scene and shifted priorities after Russia’s military attack on Ukraine, might also show flexibility on demands beyond the JCPOA to more quickly reduce Russia’s influence on the global economy by injecting Iranian oil into the market.

Under these circumstances, it appears the Islamic Republic’s main demand remains standing firm on returning to the JCPOA as the ceiling of demands, preserving nuclear infrastructure, and continuing the use of advanced centrifuge generations in production and reinforcement to preserve U.S. government JCPOA commitments and assurance of sanctions removal. Additionally, through tactical and operational measures, it will demonstrate its will on the immutability of regional policy and IRGC behavior. Within this framework, another round of power play between the two sides has begun, postponing JCPOA reconstruction to further notice and relatively increasing its complexity. Although Vienna talks have faced constraints in their latest momentum and their progress is currently halted, what has prevented the thread of hope from completely breaking is the fact that both sides of the dispute have no other viable option with calculated risks.

Contents published on the “Opinion” page do not necessarily reflect the view of Deutsche Welle Persian.