Elections and the Poverty of Iran's Political Elites
The events and debates surrounding the upcoming presidential election, the selection of candidates by the Guardian Council and their programs, and the television debates all indicate the poverty that plagues the world of politics in Iran.
Iran's political poverty, which shows itself more than ever in each election, may lead to a vicious cycle in which political cadres and elites are trained, grow, and climb the ladder of power.
Three schools for training elites and political cadres
In a large part of the world's countries, political elites and cadres are mainly trained in the process of three important experiences or within three types of political schools.
Specialized and elite higher education institutions are the main centers of initial and basic training of political cadres. Elites and cadres receive their first academic learning in core areas such as history, philosophy, law, political science, economics, public administration, sociology within an open and unrestricted academic environment. Evaluative education and research allow students to become openly acquainted with political trends and schools of thought, models and experiences, and to be involved in various scientific and theoretical debates.
The existence of research and specialized centers, international scientific congresses and meetings, and scientific relations with similar centers in other countries add to the educational richness, which should teach students basic knowledge and skills, as well as understanding and diverse approaches to the complex phenomena of today's world.
Political, trade union and civil organizations are another school of learning politics and management at the macro or regional level. Parties and civil groups create their activists and elites in the course of political life and renew their generation. Competition between parties and civil organizations, the necessity of having a program and solutions for the problems and challenges of society, the existence of opposition parties and anti-power forces in society and think tanks help in the education, growth and maturity of cadres in the blind of practical struggle.
The third school is learning the politics of practical work and participation in the political and social life of an open and competitive society. The democratic circulation of power and real participation in the democratic mechanisms of a pluralistic society, from various elections to political management at the local, regional and national levels, brings into the field a network of political cadres who must compete with their rivals in the open field of politics and society management and test the validity of their program and intellectual and practical skills in the field of political action and against public opinion.
In addition to these three main schools, free and independent media also play the role of continuous education. The great advantage of an open and democratic society is the absence of red lines and forbidden topics, and at the same time the existence of a real field of confrontation and feedback on programs, ideas and opinions. Political cadres and elites must have something to say and an answer to the problems and challenges of society with ground-based solutions so that they can gain the upper hand in judging public opinion.
They must demonstrate in practice that they are well aware of societal developments, emerging phenomena, social demands, international situations, economic or environmental mechanisms, and have ideas and plans for each field. If we ignore rare incidents in the political world of democratic countries, the main part of the political cadres gradually grows in this field of open and intense competition, shows itself and makes a place for itself in the world of politics.
In authoritarian countries, these three political schools lose their organic efficiency and dynamism, and political cadres and elites are unable to enjoy an open and evaluative education and free and competitive growth. They climb the ladder of progress not in dynamic processes of open and democratic competition but through ideological or corrupt relations with political rent. In this way, ideological dependence, non-transparent relations and bureaucratic mechanisms take the place of competence, expertise, managerial ability, creativity, planning and political legitimacy.
It is no coincidence that in non-democratic countries, there are fewer thinkers or prominent political figures, and society suffers from a kind of general political poverty. A poverty that spreads to other areas of human resources and management, because when power and management are to be exclusively distributed among obedient politicians and managers, there is little room for creativity, genius, innovation, and growth. Tyranny is afraid of independent and courageous personalities, of criticism, and considers obedience and submissiveness superior to expertise, genius, and creativity. The way to survive and progress in a closed political system is to humiliate oneself, to be humiliated, and to be patronized by the “elders of the system.”
The vicious cycle of training political elites
The thirty-odd years of the Islamic Republic are a pathological example of the training and development of political cadres and elites in Iran. The imposition of a religious order and the lack of a free and democratic environment have made the cycle of training and renewing the generation of political elites flawed and extremely inefficient.
Compared to open and democratic countries, universities in Iran, especially in the humanities and social sciences, do not perform normally. In the years after 1979, despite the imposition of the Cultural Revolution and ideological and political control, the Islamic Republic remained distrustful of the university system, and the establishment of institutions such as Imam Jafar Sadeq University, Malek Ashtar, Tarbiat Modares, or Imam Hussein University was pursued with the aim of training committed and scholarly political, technical, and scientific cadres.
However, the highly ideological atmosphere prevailing in these institutions and the selection of students based on narrow political and religious criteria have in practice resulted in their performance being very poor, especially in the areas of training political and managerial cadres, despite the allocation of ample facilities. Iranian graduates of these centers, who are supposed to train the main body of the government and administrative elite, in practice do not have much efficiency compared to students from the country's main universities or those who have studied outside Iran. The flagships of this "distinguished" group trained in an ideological atmosphere are people like Saeed Jalili.
The absence of stable and independent political parties and organizations and the closed democratic space cause political cadres to be present in the political scene more in unclear and non-competitive relationships and the renewal of the elite generation is accompanied by great slowness. In Iran, instead of independent parties and civil society organizations, hidden networks of power, godfathers, and non-elected institutions are moving political figures and cadres. Non-elected institutions, from the military forces to the "leadership council", the organization of Friday imams, eulogists, and religious leaders, have practically taken the place of parties and civil society organizations and have made it impossible to build and train elites within a conventional cycle.
Finally, the engineered political environment, very limited democracy, and security conflicts severely reduce the possibility of constructive and creative competition between tendencies, cadres, and learning in the course of political action. Electoral competitions have structural limitations that relate to the role of the leadership institution, the Guardian Council, the judiciary, and the limited media space.
The religious order and government red lines, the impermissibility of criticism of the Supreme Leader, guardians and godfathers, and non-electoral institutions impose a kind of ideological ceiling on the political space. The existence of forbidden topics and red lines paralyzes society and even creates a kind of schizophrenia in political behavior among cadres and elites because they cannot say everything or should not say anything about some realities and sometimes even speak and act contrary to their true beliefs. The existence of this ideological ceiling, prohibition, and fear causes political cadres to have little space for creative growth and learning.
For the Guardian Council, the main criterion in screening electoral candidates is not credibility, transparent and legal mechanisms, and the legitimacy of political discourse and projects, but above all, the degree of obedience to the authority of the jurist and the lack of intellectual independence. In such a political system, those who go so far as to despise and deny individual personality that they consider themselves to be “the melting pot of authority” become the sycophants of those in power.
Those who want to be content with just “obeying” the authority of the jurist are not fully trusted, and the Damocles sword of censorship and deletion always hangs over their heads. Outsiders, as “counter-revolutionary,” “anti-school,” “deviant,” “liberal,” “seditious,” “lacking insight,” and “anti-authoritarian,” have no place in political life. Thus, over the past thirty-odd years, a large number of political cadres and elites have been forced to stay at home or have been sent to prison or emigrated, and the political sphere in Iran has become poorer and poorer with the constant loss of cadres and elites.
Political poverty display
This shocking political poverty in Iran can be clearly seen in the political competitions and debates of the candidates in recent weeks. Which fundamental issues of society are being raised openly and critically? Major issues such as economic recession, environmental crisis, widespread corruption in the economy and administrative and judicial systems, political restrictions and the functioning of the Guardian Council, human rights violations, the state of education and youth, the critical conditions of minorities and the existence of various forms of discrimination, women's issues, the extensive involvement of the IRGC in the economy and smuggling of goods, foreign policy in the region, the various financial turnover and policies of large and small foundations, and the involvement of representatives of the leadership in all executive affairs have become less of a subject of open and transparent discussion.
Electoral candidates often use metaphors, innuendo, vague promises, or general and even threatening language to create an atmosphere in which it is very difficult to discern the reality or validity of a criticism or project.
Poverty of political cadres and elites, poverty of political action and thought, underdevelopment, and poverty of credible projects to change the situation in Iran result. Iranian society has paid a heavy price for this crippling political poverty over the past decades. If elections in democratic countries are a fundamental opportunity to review and criticize the past, and to see the emergence of new faces and programs, in Iran the closed circle of power, attempts to engineer elections, failure to abide by the rules of the democratic game, and structural limitations turn elections into a stage for political poverty.
Source: Radio Farda
