Water Scarcity in Iran; From ‘Security’ Perspective of Officials to Escalating Farmers’ Protests

The critical situation of water scarcity in Iran and its widespread consequences have prompted executive officials and decision-makers in this sector to repeatedly warn about the danger of transforming the water crisis from an “environmental” problem into a “security” crisis. The intensification of farmers’ protests amid ineffective management by officials in the water sector exemplifies the repercussions of this crisis. The direct link between the livelihoods of the large farming community and policies adopted regarding water distribution, utilization of water resources, and addressing the concerns of this large community has made protests and gatherings the only means for farmers to voice their grievances to authorities. Many of these protests have been suppressed by security forces, and some water distribution policies have been designed with the aim of preventing farmers’ protests.

Ineffective management by executive officials and the decisions of legislators in the water sector have not only failed to resolve Iran’s water crisis but have led the country to face “bankruptcy of water resource management.” Continuation of this trend will undoubtedly lead to farmers’ protests and increased conflicts among residents of different regions competing over water resources. A problem that has drawn considerable attention to the danger of “water wars” in Iran.

“Water Crisis” or “Bankruptcy of Water Resource Management”?

Recurrent droughts, destruction of many water sources, and unsustainable and ineffective management in the water sector have brought Iran face to face with “water scarcity” more than ever before. Statistics show that rainfall in the country has decreased by fifty percent compared to last year, many wetlands have been destroyed, and groundwater resources have been severely depleted.

Water shortage has affected the livelihoods of farmers more than any other segment of society; a large portion of water consumption in Iran is used in agriculture, and the livelihood and survival of many Iranians directly depends on “water.” Severe water shortage in the agricultural sector and ineffective management of water resources in the country are the primary reasons for farmers’ protests. Protests that, according to statistics, numbered 91 incidents in just the past solar year, and given current conditions, are likely to increase in the coming months.

Kaveh Madani, Yale University researcher and environmental activist, referring to the government’s economic policies and officials’ concerns about food security threats and the impact of these policies on water issues, told the Iran Human Rights Campaign: “Concerns about food security and the possibility of job creation for a large segment of society through agricultural development and providing water and land have resulted in today’s situation where the livelihood of many people directly depends on water, and given that there is no alternative solution to provide livelihood for these people under current water scarcity conditions, and the authorities cannot provide water and land to farmers, it is obvious that we will witness increasing unemployment, dissatisfaction, marginalization, and more tensions and conflicts.”

Kaveh Madani uses the term “water bankruptcy” to describe the current water situation in Iran. According to him, “this bankruptcy in the water sector actually forces decision-making officials to adopt worse and progressively worse policies.”

Kaveh Madani believes that Iranian officials prefer to use the word “crisis” rather than “bankruptcy” to describe the country’s water situation. Referring to influential institutions and decision-makers in the water sector and the establishment of the “Supreme Water Council” in the early 1980s, he told the Iran Human Rights Campaign: “The establishment of such institutions and organizations indicates that Iranian officials are aware of the necessity and very serious dimensions of the water problem in Iran, and perhaps these institutions make decisions that are implementable, but there is a very large gap between decision and implementation in the system, which ultimately leads to accumulation of many problems and adoption of emergency decisions that only work temporarily and like a band-aid on a wound.”

Last year, the Ministry of Energy released the first draft of a document called the “Water Law” in one of the final major policy decisions in the water sector. Although this law is not yet “applicable,” according to some experts, if approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, it would pave the way for preventing further protests from residents of the Zagros Mountain Range provinces in western and southwestern Iran.

Mehdi Pejohesh, faculty member at Shahrekord University and member of the Water Protection Committee of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province, had stated that the Water Law “was prepared to prevent protests in the water sector and to curtail the access of Zagros provinces to water.”

According to this university professor, “industrial development in desert provinces has disrupted the balance between water resources and consumption.”

Industrial development and water-intensive industries in desert provinces such as Isfahan, Yazd, and Kerman are among the issues that many critics of water sector policies have consistently addressed. A matter that has also caused some farmers’ protests.

Security Perspective on Water Issues and Expansion of Farmers’ Protests

Recent statements by the head of Iran’s Environment Organization regarding severe water conditions in the country and predictions of escalating tensions and conflicts, or as some call it, “water wars” in the country, once again drew attention to the transformation of “water scarcity” from an “environmental” problem to a “security” problem. Isa Kalantari had stated, “Water war between Isfahan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Yazd, Khuzestan, and Lorestan provinces has started, and this war is spreading from province to province, from village to village.”

In early Ordibehesht of this year, following the escalation of farmers’ protests in Isfahan, the Isfahan Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office announced that “any gathering under the guise of agricultural and Zayandeh-Rood demands without the permission of the provincial security council” is forbidden.

In this judicial body’s statement, it was claimed that farmers’ demands in recent years have been “exploited by opposition movements, and infiltrators bent on directing protests toward political and sabotage goals have been waiting in the wings.”

During these protests, some farmers from east and west Isfahan were to move toward the Zayandeh-Rood Dam with the aim of “preventing illegal withdrawals” from the Zayandeh-Rood River. The Isfahan Revolutionary Prosecutor responded to this campaign by threatening the protesting farmers that he would deal with them as “disturbers of public order.”

In recent years, farmers from Isfahan and Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari provinces have protested several times against water transfer plans from the Zayandeh-Rood River.

In the final months of 2017, farmers’ demonstrations in the “Varzaneh” region of Isfahan extended to Isfahan’s Friday prayers; at that time, a number of farmers, by attending Friday prayers, turned their backs to the Friday prayer leader’s position and chanted: “Back to the enemy – face toward the homeland.”

In 2016, during clashes in Boldaji city in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province over protests against a water transfer project, a number of farmers were arrested. In September of last year, a court in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province sentenced 76 protesting farmers against the water transfer plan to four months in prison and 30 lashes each.

Following the outbreak of multiple water-related crises, in March 2019, Ardeshir Nourian, representative of Shahrekord in the tenth parliament, announced that the “Supreme Water Council” and the “Supreme National Security Council” had ordered “avoidance of media coverage of water issues.” This is despite the fact that such orders, which usually lack legal standing and are not based on any specific law, both contradict Article 27 of the Constitution regarding freedom of assembly and unarmed marches, and have no relation to the legal obligation of Article 50 of the Constitution regarding environmental protection. Although this article considers “environmental protection” a public duty and does not impose a specific or separate duty on the government, merely limiting itself to a general prohibition on activities that are “associated with environmental pollution or irreparable degradation” thereof.

Source: Iran Human Rights Campaign