Islamic Republic of Executions; Minimum ‘Eight Thousand’ Executions in 20 Years

The judiciary of West Azerbaijan Province on the morning of July 15th, just hours after executing two inmates (Saber Sheikh Abdollah and Diako Rasoul Zadeh), issued a statement stating that “the definite policy of the judicial system during the transformation period is decisive and exemplary conduct.”
The transformation period refers to the “judicial reform” program that was introduced in December 2018 following Ibrahim Raisi’s appointment as Head of the Judiciary.
In the one and a half years since Ibrahim Raisi took office, although his supporters have focused on “fighting corruption” as the hallmark of judicial transformation, the issuance of widespread death sentences shows that the hallmark of judicial transformation in Raisi’s tenure is suppression.
The use of execution as a tool for “maximum suppression” has a long history in the Islamic Republic system.
Reports published by two organizations—Amnesty International and Iran Human Rights Organization—show that over a twenty-year period, between 2000 and 2019, 8,071 executions were carried out in Iranian prisons or in public.
The Iran Human Rights Organization also reported the execution of 600 death sentences between 2010 and 2013, which, due to lack of some documentation, were not included in the figure of over 8,000 people.
These statistics and figures have resulted in Iran consistently ranking among the countries with the highest execution rates over the past two decades, to the extent that it has become known as the “execution republic” on social media and in the press.
Currently, only 20 countries in the world issue and execute death sentences as punishment for the accused and criminals.
According to the latest report from Amnesty International released in May 2020, Iran is responsible for more than one-third of the executions recorded in the world and ranks second after China.
Iran’s long-standing partnership with China in these rankings exists while human rights organizations have repeatedly emphasized that the execution figures in Iran exceed the recorded statistics.
In addition to the fact that human rights organizations inside Iran do not have offices and resources to track and investigate reports, between 2000 and 2010, due to severe lack of information dissemination institutions such as websites and satellite television networks, as well as the absence of social media, many reports related to executions and arrests did not receive much coverage outside the country.
Although a significant portion of the executions carried out in Iran over the past two decades relates to drug trafficking, a review of certain specific periods shows that the use of execution for suppression has been a tangible judicial and security agenda.
The most notorious execution period in the past four decades relates to the summer of 1988, when, according to the memoirs of Hossein-Ali Montazeri, over 3,800 people were executed in a short period by a judicial committee to which Ibrahim Raisi was also a member.
Other examples of suppression periods can be seen in the summer of 2009 during the crackdowns following the elections, when, according to an Amnesty International report, at least 115 people were executed in Iran during a 50-day period following the elections.
From this perspective, the days when news of executions in Iran reaches its peak represent, for many who have followed the news of the past four decades, deliberate political messages from the judiciary and security apparatus of the Islamic Republic.
As an example, the confirmation of death sentences for three citizens who participated in protests in November 2019, the filing of charges of spreading corruption on earth against eight protesters in Isfahan, and the filing of charges of waging war against another protester in Islamshahr—which could lead to death sentences against these individuals—clearly show that security and judicial apparatus are using execution as a tool to send a message of suppression to society and political and civil activists.
This agenda has also been applied at provincial levels, and a recent example of it occurred in Kurdistan Province.
According to a report published by the Hengaw human rights organization, in April of the current year, 13 Kurdish citizens were executed in prisons in western Iranian provinces. This was while during the months of January, February, and March this year, 12 Kurdish citizens had been executed in these prisons.
The rapid increase in the number of executions over one month coincided with the Saqqez prison riot that resulted in 74 inmates escaping.
Following this incident, judicial authorities re-arrested some of those who had escaped and executed one of them (Mustafa Salimi), but it appears that, from the perspective of judicial and security authorities, this execution was not sufficient to convey the necessary message of suppression, and in the same month, the number of executions of Kurdish prisoners in other prisons also peaked.
The wave of execution news that has engulfed the political and civil space of Iranian society these days is also more comprehensible from this perspective.
The Judiciary wants to send the message that the first and last answer to protest and disobedience is execution, whether the protest occurred in November 2019 or February 2016 or the summer of 2009, or whether the protest is to occur in the coming months.
In the history of the Islamic Republic, execution has been both a means of treatment and a method of prevention. From the perspective of government officials, whether in fighting drugs or suppressing social protests, there is one solution to all problems: execution.
Source: Radio Farda




