“Closing the Strait of Hormuz”; Tools and Consequences

Donald Trump, the President of the United States, has resolved to completely block Iran’s oil exports. According to Brian Hook, a policy advisor at the U.S. State Department, a new round of severe U.S. sanctions against Iran will be implemented from August 4, with the next phase from November 4, with the ultimate goal of reducing Iran’s oil exports to zero.

Previously, Donald Trump had announced his agreement with the Saudi King to increase oil production by two million barrels per day to maintain the capacity of the global market following a reduction in Iran’s oil exports.

Recently, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have explicitly announced that they will increase their oil production to compensate for the oil shortage in the market as the United States intensifies sanctions against Iran.

In response to these statements and the return of sanctions, Hassan Rouhani told Iranians in Switzerland: “Americans… do not understand the meaning of this statement because it simply makes no sense that Iranian oil is not exported while regional oil is exported. If you could do this, wait to see the consequences.”

Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, in a message while thanking Hassan Rouhani’s remarks, announced that the forces under his command are ready for any policy that serves the interests of the Islamic Republic system.

Rouhani’s remarks, which constitute an implicit threat, have been interpreted in Western political and military circles as closing the Strait of Hormuz. Despite the statements of Hashmatalah Falahatpisheh, chairman of the National Security Commission of Parliament, downplaying the interpretation of Hassan Rouhani’s remarks as closing the Strait of Hormuz, Ismail Kousatheri, deputy commander of the Sarallah headquarters of the Revolutionary Guards, on Wednesday, July 4, stated that if necessary, the Strait of Hormuz would be closed to the world.

One day later, Mohammad Ali Jafari, deeming Hassan Rouhani’s recent position “decisively,” clarified: “Under likely circumstances, one can make the enemies understand what using the Strait of Hormuz for all or none could mean.”

Despite these various interpretations, the reality is that given Iran’s dark relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia, Hassan Rouhani has intended to, in a veiled manner, by showcasing the tools of power of the Islamic Republic in the Persian Gulf, alert these two countries that disruption in maritime communication lines and the passage of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Sea of Oman is one of Tehran’s prominent tools.

In this regard, several questions come to mind. Is it possible to close the Strait of Hormuz and disrupt free oil exports from the Persian Gulf? From a military perspective, what tools does the Islamic Republic have for this? Will Iran’s experience in tanker wars as part of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War be applicable? How will the United States react and what will be the consequences?

Tools

From a military perspective, the Islamic Republic has the necessary tools to disrupt maritime communication lines and even to temporarily block the Strait of Hormuz; although making it unsafe is worse than blocking it because oil tankers will no longer have the necessary security to pass through this waterway—a waterway that is one of the world’s most strategic shipping routes and through which approximately one-fifth of the world’s required oil, amounting to nearly 18.5 million barrels per day, passes.

One of the Islamic Republic’s tools for making communication lines unsafe is naval mines. A mine is considered a very strong deterrent factor in naval wars, and the number of mines of the Revolutionary Guards and Army naval forces, including the advanced Chinese “AM-52” mines, is estimated at two thousand, which is an acceptable relative capability.

Other major tools of the Republic include: fast attack craft and armed patrol boats and missile-launching vessels; surface units including patrol ships and missile-equipped destroyers and frigates; subsurface units including “Kilo-class” submarines with mine-laying capability and small submarines; shore-to-sea missiles along Iran’s coasts on the shores of the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman; commando operations to damage the offshore facilities of Arab countries; and suicide operations with boats loaded with explosives.

Experiences

During the tanker war, which began in January 1984 for four years by Saddam with the aim of cutting off Iran’s oil exports and led to the internationalization of the war in the Persian Gulf, the Revolutionary Guards gained experiences in mine-laying that caused severe damage to the “Bridgeton” oil tanker and the “Samuel B. Roberts” destroyer, and this was followed by the sinking of the “Iran Ajr” minesweeper and the execution of “Operation Achondak” by the United States.

Whether the Guards can learn lessons from its past experiences and mistakes is unclear, but this force or the Army’s naval force, if given the opportunity and suitable field for mine-laying, has the capability to contaminate parts of the Persian Gulf and even the shipping route in the Sea of Oman towards the Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Malacca—an action that, if realized, could disrupt the world oil market order.

Mine Clearing Operations

Mine clearing operations for the cleanup of contaminated areas, contrary to public perception, will be a very difficult task for the United States and other Western countries that takes time, is costly, and requires substantial human and non-human resources including minesweeping helicopters, ships and various surface and aerial units.

Based on a comprehensive study by an American expert, Caitlin Talmadge (professor at Georgetown University), mine clearing of the Strait of Hormuz and its surrounding waters by the United States requires 28 to 40 days, and if the time required for carrying out other operations to neutralize Iran’s response capability such as destroying shore-to-sea missile batteries, air defense, and its naval power is also added to the mine clearing operations, the duration of these combined measures in the best conditions would be 37 days and in the worst conditions 112 days.

In this regard, one of Iran’s major weaknesses is the lack of mine-clearing capability, meaning that if mines are laid and Iran’s ports and strategic islands are blockaded by the United States, the Islamic Republic will be unable to clear or neutralize the mines.

Conclusion

The Islamic Republic, in the worst conditions of the tanker war in the Persian Gulf, was unable to close the Strait of Hormuz and settled for harassment operations and creating insecurity in the maritime communication lines of the southern Persian Gulf countries, and ultimately direct confrontation between the United States and the Islamic Republic was one of the major factors that led the Islamic Republic to accept Security Council Resolution 598.

Currently, the Islamic Republic is looking to the proposed package of European countries and their non-compliance with U.S. sanctions and continued purchase of oil from Iran, and the current implicit threat to disrupt maritime communication lines should be considered a counter-threat in line with the U.S. effort to reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero. Nevertheless, if Iran’s oil exports are completely cut off, the Islamic Republic will have no interest in the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf and will not remain idle.

Closing the Strait of Hormuz or attempting to do so would be tantamount to declaring war on the United States and the southern Persian Gulf countries. This action will provoke a severe U.S. reaction and will legitimize U.S. actions against Iran internationally and could even lead to European and even Chinese and Russian consensus with the United States for imposing further sanctions.

The U.S. Fifth Fleet closely monitors Iranian activities in the Strait of Hormuz, and any activity of the Revolutionary Guards naval force regarding mine-laying will not escape the sight of this fleet. The United States has extensive and powerful presence in seven major and minor military bases in the southern Persian Gulf countries and, in the final analysis, in a military confrontation with Iran, has the capability to inflict heavy damage on Iran.

In this context, Hassan Rouhani’s alignment with the positions and statements of Revolutionary Guards commanders who seek to push Iran into military conflict is a source of concern—commanders who, mostly due to lack of necessary military knowledge and incorrect processing of information or for political reasons, with the exaggeration of the Guards’ capabilities, have a distorted and popular perception of American capabilities and the military-political alliances of regional actors and can, by instilling false confidence in the country’s executive officials, bring about catastrophe.

Hassan Rouhani has abandoned his so-called “reformist” promises and joined the ranks of the Guards commanders and hardliners. The phrase “I kiss your hand” in Qasem Soleimani’s message and Mohammad Ali Jafari’s support for Hassan Rouhani’s recent “decisive” positions and the country’s executive officials for “revolutionary approach and perspective in the battlefield against the enemy,” indicates this shift in Iran’s domestic political arena. Increasing internal and external pressures on all factions have brought them closer together, and the issue of the survival of the Islamic government, regardless of whatever costs the people will bear, is increasingly in focus.

Source: Radio Farda