Shiite Clergy and Iran's Economic Decline
Following a dull ceremony under the titles of “implementation” and “amendment,” the helm of the Islamic Republic’s executive branch was transferred from one general to another. Hassan Rouhani left the presidency with a disastrous economic record, and Ebrahim Raisi succeeded him with the slogan of transformation but without any plan or vision.
This shift took place in the context of one of the most turbulent periods in Iran's contemporary history, with economic decline being one of its main roots.
Given the nature of the political system in the Islamic Republic, a very large portion of Iranian public opinion considers the Mu'ammin and their followers to be the main cause of this degeneration.
Warning
The generals' all-out dominance over the country's governance levers, including in the economic sphere, and the blow this dominance has inflicted on both Iranian society and the traditional influence of the Shiite clergy, is clearer than the sun. With the intensification of economic difficulties and the existing chaos in the field of public services (including water and electricity), voices are being heard from the generals' camp, even those close to the spectrum of power, against this group's grip on the most important helms of governance in the country.
Recently, in connection with the approaching presidential elections, Masih Mohajeri, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Jomhuri Eslami, who is himself a general, warned that he was "concerned about the position of the clergy" and that "the presence of a cleric in the presidency in the coming term, which requires accepting responsibility for securing the people's livelihood, is not in the country's best interest."
Why this warning? In his June 3 note titled “On a Benevolent Proposal,” Masih Mohajeri answers this question as follows: “Currently, the country’s conditions are such that, in the eyes of public opinion, all problems, even those related to bread and water and the basic needs of people’s lives, are attributed to the clergy. Those who are comprehensively informed about the country’s situation know that it is not possible to fix this chaotic situation with the slogans raised by presidential candidates – both clerics and non-clergymen. The fact that the clergy has become entrenched in public opinion and has brought the country to this day, with the continued presence of a cleric in the position of president, can strengthen this way of thinking and increase concerns about the institution of the clergy.”
The note from the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Jomhuri Eslami, which actually targeted Ebrahim Raisi without mentioning his name, titled its "benevolent proposal" as follows: "Clergy should be content with their presence in legislative, judicial, and cultural positions and hand over the executive responsibility that deals with people's livelihoods to people who specialize in related fields."
Apparently, such warnings are no longer useful. During the Islamic Revolution and the years that followed, a large part of the Shiite clergy, enjoying an exceptional position, sold their spiritual and enduring power for the glamour of the "emergency government", seized the main levers of political power and used them to seize the sources of production and distribution of wealth, without thinking about the outcome, which would come sooner or later.
The economy is the most dangerous arena for those who introduce themselves as "spiritual". In all religions, the clergy is the guardian of eternal and eternal dogmas, and its authority rests on beliefs that cannot be doubted. The Prophet Muhammad being the Seal of the Prophets, the Imamate of Ali ibn Abi Talib, and the expectation of the appearance of the Imam of the Time are among the foundations of Twelver Shiite beliefs, and the slightest doubt in any of these foundations will collapse this entire belief system.
From the realm of certainty to the sea of doubt
Unlike religious beliefs, science is based on doubt and change and evolution are inherent in it. Of course, the sciences known as "minutes" have laboratories. In chemistry, the mixing of two elements and its consequences can be experienced in the laboratory. If this experiment is repeated in the same space and there is no change in the conditions under which it is carried out, it will lead to the same results.
Economics belongs to the group of "social sciences" and it is not possible to conduct experiments in it, except in a few cases. The laboratory of economists is the history of human societies, and the results obtained from historical experiences, due to the complexity of human individual and social behaviors, including the influence of their beliefs and living environment, are faced with a thousand "buts" and "whys". What is the point of a "spiritual system", with its sacred unwavering beliefs, stepping into an arena where conflict over theories is rampant?
In all religions, the entry of clerics into politics is problematic for both society and themselves, especially in the highly complex world of the 21st century. Statesmen are not necessarily economists, but they are the final decision-makers in various areas of their own economy, from determining budget and foreign trade policies to combating inflation and unemployment... In all these areas, statesmen, even if they are economists, seek the advice of experts and are usually presented with different and sometimes contradictory opinions. Using personal knowledge and experience, and the opinions of various advisors, it is ultimately the statesman who must make a decision, implement it, and accept its consequences.
A statesman is subject to the judgment of the citizens on the basis of the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of his economic promises. Even in dictatorial systems, a politician cannot escape this judgment by resorting to lies and propaganda. Lies and propaganda may work in the short term, but the burden of inflation and unemployment is too heavy to not be felt. That is why it is said that “the economy does not lie.”
Once again, we return to the role of the Shiite clergy in the economic arena. A general with titles such as Ayatollah and Hujjat al-Islam is safe from danger as long as he remains in his traditional role and speaks to the people about his religious beliefs. On the other hand, if he enters the arenas of this world and accepts responsibility and commitment in worldly fields, he inevitably accepts the risk of being questioned and defeated.
In fact, when a person belonging to the religious hierarchy steps from the immutable world of religious beliefs into the shifting sands of economics and its management, it is as if he is thrown from the realm of certainty into a sea of doubt. Will a statesman dressed in the garb of Shiite generalities, whose worldly promises turn out to be lies, be able to continue to be the guardian of religious dogmas, and not endanger the authority of the entire clerical institution?
From Rouhani's record to Raisi's promises
During the 2013 presidential election campaign, Hassan Rouhani, dressed as the “Proof of Islam” and dressed in the “clothes of the Prophet of Islam” (as the generals claim), told his audience that “my speech will be about saving the economy, reviving morality, and interacting with the world.” And when he was asked in a telephone conversation about the future of the cash subsidy of the Ahmadinejad era, his response was: “The government of prudence and hope seeks to create such economic prosperity, and for people to have such a rich income, that they will no longer need these 45,000 tomans.”
Where have Hassan Rouhani's promises gone after eight years? Average growth of zero percent, Iran's second highest inflation rate in the past 77 years (after the inflation of 1995), a drop of one-third of national per capita income (according to the assessment of the Majlis Research Center), or 20 percent in urban areas and 31 percent in rural areas (according to the assessment of the Statistics Center of Iran). In short, during Hassan Rouhani's rule, a significant part of Iran's middle class fell below the poverty line.
Arguing about which factions and individuals dragged the "Government of Wisdom and Hope" into such a quagmire with their obstructionism is not very helpful in understanding what happened. Hassan Rouhani has been one of the architects of the Islamic Republic system from the beginning and knew very well that the Supreme Leader has never presented a bouquet of flowers to any president to date.
Unlike his successor, Hassan Rouhani was familiar with economic issues in Iran and the world. In fact, the former president's statements and writings show that he was more skilled in dealing with economic events than any other head of Iran's executive branch after the revolution.
That he left such a disastrous record despite this skill is a reflection on the entire Islamic Republic. In the 42-year history of this system, Hassan Rouhani was the third head of the executive branch, after Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, to think that Iran’s theocracy could be reconciled with economic development. That his presidency ended in such a shambles is significant to all observers of Iranian affairs.
Unlike his predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi is alienated from the economic life of Iran and the world, and he painfully displayed this alienation during the recent election debates. The president’s newly-prepared economic “program” is the “Economic Committee of the Coordination Council of Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi’s Popular Headquarters,” in which his goals in the economic sphere are categorized under seven headings: increasing production and exports, reducing household spending, increasing household income, reforming the financial system, reforming the tax system, reforming the budget structure, and increasing transparency.
At the same time, stages have been set for each of the goals, and the timing of each stage has been determined from now until August 1404, which is the end of Ebrahim Raisi's mission.
It is not difficult to list these goals and commit to the steps to achieve them. What is difficult, and not mentioned in the goal-setting board, is how to achieve them. For example, let's look at the first and second goals:
1) The first goal is to increase production and exports, and based on the schedule, it is predicted that from 1401 (2022), the average economic growth rate will reach above five percent, in 1402 (2023), the country's entire foreign exchange needs will be met through non-oil exports, and by 1404 (2025), non-oil exports will at least double (from $35 billion to $70 billion).
A quick look at the various stages of achieving the first goal immediately raises the question of how the transition from these stages will be possible? By what miracle is the average zero percent economic growth rate in the 2011s going to reach five percent per year? It has been said that this growth rate will be achieved by emphasizing productivity improvement; the question is how the current catastrophic productivity, which is negative, will become the driving force of Iran's economic growth in a year's time?
Also, regarding the first goal, how does the 13th government intend to increase non-oil exports from $35 billion to $70 billion? How much investment does the country need, both to improve productivity and to increase non-oil exports? How much of this investment will be provided from abroad? In order to achieve five percent growth and $70 billion in non-oil exports, are sanctions going to be lifted? And these questions can be continued…
2) But achieving the second goal (reducing household spending) relies on a series of populist promises, including issuing livelihood credit cards for the top five income deciles, building four million housing units in the next four years, reducing the share of housing in the household spending basket (from 50 percent to 30 percent), and generous health initiatives. Here too, we are faced with the question of how these measures will be financed.
Most importantly, to achieve the goal of "reducing household costs," the Raisi government is committed to first reducing the inflation rate to half the 2020 inflation rate (from 36 percent to 18 percent) and then moving towards a single-digit rate for this index. Here, too, the question of how to achieve this goal arises. Why did the Hassan Rouhani government (based on official statistics on July inflation) reach the end of the line with an official inflation rate of over 44 percent? Why will the Ebrahim Raisi government be more successful than the Hassan Rouhani government in dealing with this terrible scourge?
The next five goals raise the same questions. Why should Iranian public opinion, which will not soon forget the very bitter experience of the "Government of Prudence and Hope," take Ebrahim Raisi's promises seriously? What personalities, with what level of knowledge and experience, are going to take on the task of performing such miracles in the economic arena?
Over the past four decades, the generals’ entry into the highly volatile arena of economic governance has come at a staggering cost not only to Iran but also to the Shiite clergy and its future. The Raisi administration will make this cost even higher.
Source: Radio Farda
