Methods and Tactics of the Islamic Republic’s Governance for Intensifying Control and Security Policies Against Citizens’ Fundamental Freedoms
What are the methods and tactics of the Islamic Republic’s governance aimed at depriving citizens of their freedoms? How do officials of the Islamic Republic implement their control and security policies into practice?
What are examples of these control policies, security-oriented perspectives, and methods of government interference in citizens’ private lives? From launching a university major in “commanding right and forbidding wrong” to the cooperation of security and military institutions with organizations such as Tehran Municipality under the pretext of monitoring and countering social problems and issues, these are fresh examples of the governance’s approach in this regard. The intensified role of security and military institutions in citizens’ daily lives and authorities’ insistence on implementing such plans, apart from depriving citizens of their fundamental rights and freedoms, represent clear contradictions with those principles of the Constitution that specifically emphasize citizens’ rights and freedom of expression. The government’s decisions to intensify its control and security policies, even if in the form of legislation, contradict Article 9 of Iran’s Constitution, which states “no official has the right to deprive legitimate freedoms in the name of preserving national independence and territorial integrity, even through imposing laws and regulations.” Although Iran’s government relies on Article 8 of the Constitution to implement these policies against citizens’ fundamental freedoms, the issue is that in implementing this policy, in practice and contrary to this legal principle, no room has been given for the people’s right to command right and forbid wrong in addressing the government. In other words, careful attention to these constitutional principles reveals the contradictory behavior of many components of the Islamic Republic’s governance with the law, which ultimately targets “rule of law.” Of course, it should be noted that the continuation of the government’s approach based on controlling citizens and securitizing the social space, in addition to questioning “rule of law,” also narrows the space for public protests among different segments of society.
Launching a University Major in “Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong”
For many Iranian citizens, the concept of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” is directly linked to the concept of “guidance patrols” and, in fact, to “interference” in citizens’ private lives. A matter whose manifestations in recent years under the governance of the Islamic Republic in Iran have appeared in various forms in the lives of many citizens; one could say that the regime’s continuation of strict handling of the “hijab” issue is the best example of the governance’s persistent gaze on citizens’ “daily life,” which throughout all these years has been manifested under the concept of “commanding right and forbidding wrong.”
Article 8 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran states: “In the Islamic Republic of Iran, calling to good, commanding right and forbidding wrong is a reciprocal and universal duty incumbent on people toward each other, the state toward the people, and the people toward the state. The law shall specify its conditions, limits, and manner.” In fact, the emphasis on the reciprocal relationship between the state and the people in the matter of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” is precisely what has been completely ignored in the governance’s approach. This matter is, of course, more than anything else the result of the continuation of a perspective that has gradually created conditions to fundamentally deprive “the people” of benefiting from this constitutional principle. One could say that the establishment of the “Headquarters for Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong” in the early 1990s is one of the manifestations of the governance’s view of this constitutional principle. A headquarters that throughout all its years of operation has always enjoyed open support from the highest officials of the system and has pursued numerous plans at considerable cost to expand its activities and infiltration into educational and training institutions.
In late October of this year, the spokesman for the Headquarters for Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong announced the launching of a field of study “commanding right and forbidding wrong” at bachelor’s and master’s levels at Azad University. Although according to this official, there is “no commitment” to hiring graduates of this major, they can be used “in the field of training teachers, instructors, and committees for commanding right and forbidding wrong in government offices.”
The mere existence of the “Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong” headquarters, whose members are all composed of government officials and authorities, and the illegal and sometimes inhumane behaviors and conduct of “guidance patrol” officers with citizens have in themselves created considerable distance between the approach of power and what exists in the law regarding “commanding right and forbidding wrong.” The headquarters’ effort to launch a university major and utilize graduates in the mentioned fields actually widens this “gap” further.
Although government officials in Iran insist on suggesting that the concept of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” differs from “interference in individuals’ private lives,” the existing reality and, of course, the constant emphasis by officials themselves on this “difference” shows that the prevailing narrative about “commanding right and forbidding wrong” in Iranian society is equivalent to “interference in people’s private lives.”
On the other hand, measures such as launching university majors in this field are in a sense an attempt by the government to legitimize interference in citizens’ daily lives. Putting together many government measures such as widespread filtering of social media networks and efforts to more easily control citizens in the virtual world through implementing the National Internet project, as well as fears of intensifying protests by different segments of society and civil activists and efforts to suppress dissenting voices, are signs of the government’s determination to increasingly “securitize” the social space and control and monitor the daily lives of Iranian citizens. A project whose other layers are also visible in the components of governance.
The IRGC’s Entry into Social Issues with the Establishment of a “Headquarters” in Tehran Municipality
In the view of many analysts, following the administration of Ebrahim Raisi, the overall political landscape of governance became more “monolithic” than at any other time in the past four decades; a parliament headed by Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf and a judiciary headed by a former deputy of Ebrahim Raisi and, of course, the presence of security and military figures in other important government positions such as the mayor of the capital Tehran. One of the most important effects of this “monolithic” consolidation is the promotion of a security-oriented perspective in various settings of society and certainly behaviors based on “preference,” which ultimately leads to the loss of “rule of law” in society.
Undoubtedly, one of the most important aspects of this trend is the government’s attempt to deprive citizens of their freedoms through the entry of military and security forces such as the Basij and IRGC into neighborhoods in various Iranian cities. Plans such as “neighborhood-based IRGC patrols” that were mostly pursued under the justification of establishing security and more seriously after the protests of December 2017 and November 2019.
One of the consequences of the continuation and, of course, propaganda surrounding such plans is making them appear “legal.” In cases where legal responsibility in addressing and resolving social problems or establishing order and discipline for specific organizations and institutions mentioned in the law is determined, insisting on implementing such plans over the long term gives them a legal appearance and, of course, reduces the effectiveness of the law.
Article 9 of Iran’s Constitution states: “In the Islamic Republic of Iran, freedom and independence and unity and territorial integrity of the country are inseparable from each other, and their preservation is the duty of the state and all the nation’s members. No individual or group or official has the right to harm in the least Iran’s political, cultural, economic, military independence and territorial integrity under the pretext of exercising freedom, and no official has the right to deprive legitimate freedoms in the name of preserving national independence and territorial integrity, even through imposing laws and regulations.”
In fact, looking at this constitutional principle can reveal the contradictory behavior of many components of governance with the law, which ultimately targets rule of law. Several months after Alireza Zakani assumed the position of Tehran mayor, news was circulated about launching a “social headquarters” in the capital. A headquarters that would be pursued by the “Headquarters of Khatam al-Anbiya of the IRGC and with the help of mosques and Friday prayer leaders” regarding “social welfare.” Alireza Zakani, the mayor of Tehran, in explaining the work of this headquarters, referred to cooperation in addressing certain social problems and issues such as the presence of addicts in some parts of Tehran. The increasing role of military and security forces in various layers of social life and the dominance of military and security narratives in the government’s approach to social problems increasingly heighten concerns about the “securitization” of the space. This is especially so at a time when much of Iranian society is struggling with numerous economic and social problems and has no choice but to protest and strike.
Source: Human Rights Campaign
