What Does Iran’s Violation of the JCPOA Mean?

Iran is responding to American sanctions and unfulfilled European promises by announcing its intention to withdraw from its commitments under the JCPOA. This is a report by Hans Spross, correspondent of Deutsche Welle’s German section, on Iran’s recent actions.

One year after the United States’ unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran, Hassan Rouhani, the country’s president, announced “partial and comprehensive reductions in Iran’s commitments under the JCPOA” and declared that Iran would no longer be bound by limits on uranium and heavy water storage. Iran’s president also said on Wednesday: “We are abandoning this commitment [to 3.67% enrichment] and will increase enrichment to whatever level we want and whatever our needs and necessities require.” Rouhani gave European parties to the JCPOA until next Sunday and said, “From July 7, if the other parties do not fulfill all their commitments according to the timeline, the Arak reactor will revert to its previous conditions.”

All these restrictions were put in place to limit Iran’s path to acquiring an atomic bomb for as long as possible.

On Monday, June 30, Iran announced an increase in its enriched uranium reserves. The International Atomic Energy Agency, in its initial reaction to the news of exceeding the permitted level, announced that it is aware of the matter and will soon report on Iran’s action.

Has Iran moved closer to the atomic bomb with this step?

The answer to this question is theoretically yes, but practically no. For this purpose, Iran does not have sufficient uranium reserves with the required concentration. When the JCPOA was concluded, Iran had access to approximately 12,000 kilograms of low-enriched uranium and significantly more active centrifuges compared to today for producing uranium needed for nuclear weapons.

Experts say that to build a warhead, Iran must have at least four times more than the current 300 kilograms of enriched uranium and continue enrichment. Oliver Meyer, a weapons expert from the Science and Policy Institute in Berlin, believes that the message of Iran’s recent actions, withdrawing from JCPOA commitments, is not resuming a military nuclear program. This expert adds: “For this purpose, completely different measures are needed, both in scope and quality.” According to Meyer, Iran’s nuclear program remains, at a distance, a nuclear program that is “strictly controlled” in the world, and therefore it cannot be said that Iran is resuming a military nuclear program with these steps.

Is the nuclear agreement on the brink of collapse?

Since all signatory countries of the JCPOA, except the United States—including Iran itself, or at least the Hassan Rouhani government—want to continue this agreement, it can be said that the JCPOA has not yet failed.

However, if Iran implements its withdrawal from its commitments under the JCPOA, according to Oliver Meyer, the question arises: “What will be the European response?” This expert continues: “They have always said they will support the nuclear agreement as long as Iran also remains committed to all its obligations. But Iran is no longer following this path, and after actions such as increasing enrichment or resuming the Arak heavy water reactor’s activities, it will certainly become harder for Europeans to maintain the JCPOA and argue that this is not a ‘significant violation’.”

In other words, excessive provocation by Iran could, in the worst case, lead to the return of all European Union and UN sanctions and a new confrontation between the international community and Iran.

Iran says that despite crossing some defined borders, it has not violated the nuclear agreement. How should this issue be evaluated?

Oliver Meyer says: “In fact, Iran explained in 2015 and included this matter in the agreement, that if sanctions are resumed, it would consider this as grounds for partial or complete cessation of its commitments under the JCPOA.” But according to this expert, the European Union has always rejected Iran’s argument that if the United States or Europeans do not implement part of their commitments, the other party will also not fully implement its obligations. According to Oliver Meyer, Europe’s position is that breach of contract by one party does not justify the same action by the other.

Is the European Union the intended recipient of Iran’s recent actions? How successful will Iran be in forcing Europe to fulfill its commitments [with its threats]?

According to François Nicoullaud, former French ambassador to Iran, deliberate violation of the JCPOA, whether it is implemented or Iran threatens to implement it, is above all a cry for help to partners to pull Iran out of the increasing economic difficulties it faces and the consequences of American sanctions.

For this purpose, Britain, Germany, and France launched INSTEX, which in the first phase is a financial mechanism for transactions of non-sanctioned goods in the field of essential and vital commodities.

Oliver Meyer says this financial mechanism has been strengthened in recent weeks.

The European Union announced last Friday the operationalization of INSTEX, and other European countries also announced in a statement that they are ready to participate in the INSTEX company’s shares. From Iran’s perspective, deliberate violation of the JCPOA, or in other words, threatening to violate or reduce commitments, albeit limited, has been successful. Nevertheless, INSTEX has not yet played a role in two important areas: resuming oil trade and increasing significant investments in Iran.

Source: DW