Hassan Shariatemadari: Next Popular Uprising May Be Uncontrollable

The Islamic Republic, simultaneously facing intensified economic pressure from the United States, a naval blockade, and disputes over the continuation of war, is confronting a deeper crisis within its power structure. Hassan Shariatemadari, a political activist and analyst of Iranian affairs, believes that the continuation of current conditions could lead to a new uprising, potentially even more extensive than the December 2025 protests. Meanwhile, an unprecedented warning by Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf about the danger of famine, Masoud Pezeshkian’s emphasis on the necessity of understanding with America, and Washington’s announcement of a new strategy all paint a picture of mounting pressures on Tehran.

As Iran grapples with the consequences of war, extensive sanctions, and trade restrictions, Washington has begun a new phase of economic pressure.

Scott Bessent, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, in an article published in the Financial Times, called this phase “Economic D-Day” and said the goal is to sever the Islamic Republic’s financial and economic pathways and completely isolate Tehran. He warned that countries and companies that assist in continuing trade with Iran may also face severe consequences.

This situation has developed as the value of the rial has reached its lowest levels. According to an Associated Press report, on Monday, August 24, the rial’s exchange rate in the informal market plummeted to approximately 2.02 million rials per dollar, while anticipation of new U.S. sanctions has added to economic pressure.

Within Iran as well, there are signs of concern about the economic consequences of war and sanctions. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Speaker of Parliament, at a meeting of Iranian and Iraqi economic activists in Baghdad, warned about the direct link between economy and security, saying: “No matter how much military power we have, if people are hungry and we lack monetary circulation and economic growth, we cannot endure.” Qalibaf also emphasized: “Security and economy are two wings of each other.”

These remarks quickly drew media attention, with some interpreting them as a sign of concern within the Islamic Republic’s structure about the impact of economic pressure on the government’s political stability. The Parliament Media Center later announced that parts of the Speaker’s remarks had been “cut and distorted” and published the full text of his statements.

However, even in the full version of the remarks, Qalibaf emphasized that military power without economic backing cannot guarantee the country’s survival. Meanwhile, Masoud Pezeshkian also took a position against opponents of an Iran-America understanding, a position that demonstrates that the disagreement over the Islamic Republic’s future path extends beyond the power structure.

Iran’s president said this understanding was the result of “professional consensus of everyone who had a hand in the fire” and emphasized that the decision was made after lengthy discussions and negotiations.

Pezeshkian, criticizing the agreement’s opponents, said: “They deny it because they either don’t understand the issue or have no hand in the fire.” He then added, using a Quranic expression: “Those who refuse to think will not hear no matter what you tell them.” Pezeshkian has also described the country’s current conditions as an “all-out economic, military, and security war.”

These statements, alongside Qalibaf’s remarks, demonstrate that within a part of the Islamic Republic’s formal structure, economic pressure and the continuation of war have become issues related to the system’s survival.

Hassan Shariatemadari, a political activist and analyst of Iranian affairs, in an interview with Euronews, does not consider the current crisis merely a result of differences between the government and military forces, and believes that parts of the Revolutionary Guards may see the continuation of war as necessary to preserve their position.

In his analysis of the situation following the death of Ali Khamenei, he believes that groups within the power structure have placed Mojtaba Khamenei’s name at the center of the new structure to prevent a leadership vacuum.

Shariatemadari says: “In my opinion, the insistence on Mojtaba Khamenei’s leadership is more of a symbolic function to prevent a leadership void, and right now the rumor that they will announce his death is very strong.”

He adds that the question of Mojtaba Khamenei’s condition has become part of competition over the future of the leadership structure.

However, contradictory accounts have emerged regarding Mojtaba Khamenei’s actual condition. In recent months, Islamic Republic officials have spoken of his survival in the March 1 attack, and some officials have even claimed that he suffered only minor injuries. At the same time, his prolonged absence from public view and the lack of verified images or public appearances have fueled speculation.

Therefore, claims about his death or survival should still be examined within the framework of unverified reports and speculation.

Shariatemadari further considers internal disagreements within the Revolutionary Guards as one of the important factors complicating the negotiation process. He says: “So far, no other faction within the Revolutionary Guards, except those who are in the field creating chaos, has been seen.”

In his view, some younger forces within the Revolutionary Guards may be concerned that the end of war and normalization of conditions could weaken this institution’s special position in the country’s political and security structure.

Shariatemadari relates this concern to the experience of armed groups in some regional countries and says: “Forces within the Revolutionary Guards may fear that after the war ends, a similar fate awaits them.” In such a framework, the main disagreement is not only over “war or peace,” but the question of what changes the end of war will bring to the balance of power within the Islamic Republic.

Shariatemadari believes Tehran is simultaneously considering several scenarios, from continuing negotiations with Washington to military action to break the blockade. He says: “Breaking the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz or reaching an understanding with America are both scenarios considered by the Iranian government.”

According to him, the Islamic Republic on one hand does not want to pay the political cost of an agreement with America, and on the other hand faces the risk of intensifying internal crisis with the continuation of blockade and cutting financial resources.

Shariatemadari warns: “If America continues the blockade and leaves no way out for them, under the guise of attacking American bases, they would attack Iran’s neighbors and compensate for their financial shortages through looting.”

This part of his analysis is a possible scenario and not a report of a definitive Islamic Republic decision.

Meanwhile, international reports also show that the Strait of Hormuz issue has become one of the main points of concern. Iran has threatened that if countries support America’s economic campaign, it may disrupt oil exports from the region, a threat that has increased concerns about global energy markets.

According to Shariatemadari, the main danger for the Islamic Republic may not come from outside but from within Iranian society. He says: “The continuation of this deplorable situation is dangerous for the Islamic Republic in that it causes an inevitable uprising of the people; people who have no choice in this economic misery but to rise up against the government, because the continuation of this situation is against the existence of the Iranian people.”

He further warns that the government will likely try to suppress any potential protests, but the scale of future protests may be different.

Shariatemadari says: “The Islamic Republic is deeply concerned about such an uprising and will certainly try to prevent people’s uprising through killing, as in December of last year, but this time the uprising might be on such a scale that controlling it even through killing would be very difficult.”

This assessment is being made in circumstances where Iran faces inflation, the collapse of the national currency’s value, trade restrictions, and pressure from war. Associated Press also considered the latest rial collapse as another sign of intensifying economic pressure on Iranian society.

Another dimension of Shariatemadari’s analysis is the possibility of decreased loyalty of security and military forces if the crisis expands. He says, referring to experiences of other countries: “In any case, global experiences show that at some point, even ideological forces suffer moral stagnation, realize the emptiness of their path, become discouraged and hopeless, and the possibility of schism and attrition among them is very high.”

According to him, even within the Islamic Republic’s structure, there is mention of the possibility of repeated widespread protests as a serious threat.

Shariatemadari believes that the government, of two major threats—external attack and internal uprising—is most concerned about popular protests, because if there is a breach in suppressive forces, controlling the streets could become much harder.

Perhaps the most important part of Shariatemadari’s analysis is not his prediction about war or sanctions, but his assessment of the Islamic Republic’s relationship with Iranian society. He says: “They want people more as a tool to validate their own policies, they do not recognize an independent identity for civil society and the people, and in no faction of this system can any plan for approaching the people, accepting people’s demands, apologizing to the people, and changing policy be observed; therefore, they have already signed the decree of their own destruction with their own hands.”

This view links the Islamic Republic’s future less to merely the outcome of military confrontation with America and more to the government’s ability to manage internal crisis and rebuild its relationship with society.

The sum of recent developments presents an image of a government facing multiple simultaneous crises: mounting economic pressure, new American sanctions, threats related to the Strait of Hormuz, disagreement over negotiations, and ambiguity about the future of the leadership structure.

Washington explicitly speaks of a strategy aimed at completely isolating the Islamic Republic. The Financial Times reported that Bessent has asked countries and companies that continue to maintain economic relations with Tehran to choose between cooperation with the global financial system and continued support for Iran.

In Tehran as well, warnings are heard about the consequences of famine and economic collapse, and at the political level, there is disagreement over how to end the war and engage with America. Qalibaf speaks of the necessity of preserving economic backing while Pezeshkian defends an understanding that its opponents reject.

In such circumstances, the main question is no longer only whether external pressure can weaken the Islamic Republic; the more important question is how long the power structure in Tehran can simultaneously control the economy, security forces, and a dissatisfied society if economic pressure and war continue.

Shariatemadari’s analysis provides no clear answer to this question, but his warning is explicit: if the economic crisis reaches a point where a large segment of society no longer has the possibility of continuing a normal life, the next uprising may not be a repetition of past protests, but a different and much more extensive phase of confrontation between society and government.