Trump’s Hesitation Between Blockade and Attack; Economic Pressure Becomes Washington’s Main Weapon Against Iran

US President Donald Trump has spoken of three paths to force the Islamic Republic into retreat, while Washington is currently focusing on naval blockade and economic pressure rather than immediate military escalation. This strategy, pursued simultaneously with the collapse of national currency value, high inflation, and worsening economic hardships in Iran, could place the country’s economy under even greater pressure.

In a television interview, Trump attributed Iran’s current condition to American economic and financial pressures, stating that Washington currently has three options: “Continue pressure and blockade, deliver severe military strikes, or use economic pressure to force Tehran to change its behavior.”

Regarding the economic path he favors, the US president said: “Economically, they are a mess. They cannot borrow money. We control their money, the money they had and it was considerable. I am their banker.”

Trump also claimed Iran’s inflation rate has reached 300 percent, the national currency has severely depreciated, and military personnel wages face difficulties. These figures, particularly regarding inflation, do not necessarily align with official statistics and independent estimates available, and should be considered as Trump’s assessment of Iran’s situation.

Nevertheless, the principle of economic pressure on Iran is not new. US sanctions over recent years have limited Iran’s access to financial resources, foreign trade, oil revenues, and the international banking network. In 2026, Washington has intensified the naval blockade in an effort to increase the economic cost of pressure on Tehran.

Reports published in international media show that the options presented for the future of American policy toward Iran essentially boil down to three paths: “reaching an agreement, continuing blockade and economic pressure, or returning to extensive military attacks.”

Reuters reported on Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu’s late July meeting that three options have been seriously considered: “An agreement, continued blockade and economic pressure, and an extensive attack.”

Axios also reported that at this meeting, continued naval blockade combined with increased economic pressure alongside negotiations and resumption of military attacks were examined as three main paths. However, recent signs suggest that the Trump administration is, at least currently, pursuing economic pressure as an alternative to immediate military attack.

The Wall Street Journal, in a report published today, wrote that Trump, after the failure of military attacks and negotiations to quickly achieve Washington’s objectives, has again shifted toward economic pressure. According to this report, the US government is pursuing naval blockade and financial sanctions to weaken Iran’s economy and force Tehran to accept Washington’s demands.

The Associated Press has also described this shift as “a return to financial sanctions” and reported that the Trump administration hopes economic pressure will force Iran to accept American demands. Meanwhile, some analysts express doubt about the success of economic pressure as a quick solution to end the crisis.

Trump’s rhetoric about Iran’s economy reveals that the American president views financial pressure as part of a power struggle with Tehran. In describing America’s role in Iran’s economy, he said: “We control their money, the money they had and it was considerable. I am their banker.”

These remarks come as Iran’s economy has long suffered from declining rial value, high inflation, limited access to foreign resources, and reduced household purchasing power.

Iran’s parliament removed the then-economy minister “Abdolnasser Hemmati” in March 2025 amid severe rial depreciation and rising prices of essential goods, which had become one of the main targets of criticism from lawmakers. Reuters reported that the rial lost nearly half its value against the dollar during Hemmati’s tenure as minister.

The Financial Times also wrote when reporting Hemmati’s removal that Iran’s economy has faced a roughly 60 percent decline in national currency value, rising prices of essential goods, and increasing pressure from sanctions.

Therefore, even if some figures cited by Trump regarding inflation levels are not precise, the essence of his claim about Iran’s economic fragility aligns with a significant portion of economic reports and statements by Iranian officials.

On the other side, some Iranian officials have explicitly spoken about the need to reduce economic pressure. “Kazem Gharibabadi,” Iran’s deputy foreign minister and one of the main figures in the negotiating team, has emphasized in recent months the necessity of finding a way to reduce sanctions. Regarding negotiations with America, he has said: “Negotiation is neither a miracle nor a betrayal.”

This stance reveals an important divide in Iran’s political landscape: on one side, factions that view negotiations under American pressure as fruitless or costly, and on the other, groups that believe without reducing sanctions, overcoming the economic crisis will be difficult.

Reuters also previously reported that Gharibabadi warned regarding new European sanctions that the return of sanctions could complicate matters related to Iran’s nuclear program, and Tehran continues to seek ways to manage the crisis through negotiations.

American economic pressure is intensifying at a time when Iran’s economic problems were already profound before the current phase. Abdolnasser Hemmati, who now again heads Iran’s Central Bank, had previously spoken of a severe decline in real per capita income for Iranians. Various sources have cited declining purchasing power, rial collapse, and rising essential goods prices as main indicators of Iran’s economic crisis.

This situation extends beyond monetary indicators. Declining real income, labor market pressure, increased poverty, and problems accessing essential goods have further broadened the social effects of the economic crisis. In such circumstances, naval blockade could increase pressure on Iran’s export revenues, particularly if Tehran’s ability to sell and transfer oil and access foreign currency resources becomes further restricted.

The Wall Street Journal also reported that the Trump administration believes economic pressure could, compared to military attacks, have greater long-term impact on the Iranian government’s capacity to continue. This is where the gap emerges between Washington’s claims and expert assessments.

Trump believes economic pressure can bring Tehran to a point where continuing the current situation becomes impossible for the Islamic Republic. However, the experience of sanctions over the past several years has shown that Iran’s economy, despite severe damage, has been able to adapt to some limitations.

The Associated Press also emphasized in its report on the Trump administration’s new strategy that critics doubt the effectiveness of sanctions as a quick solution and recalled that past economic pressures have not necessarily led to the political changes Washington expected. From this perspective, the issue is not only how much weaker Iran’s economy has become; the more important question is at what point economic pressure will lead to a change in Tehran’s political calculations.

Trump continues to present the nuclear issue as the main reason for his policy toward Iran. He has said: “I basically got into this for one main reason: Iran cannot have nuclear weapons and now it cannot.”

The US president has also claimed that his withdrawal from the JCPOA prevented Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. He stated in this regard: “If I had not canceled it, they would have had nuclear weapons five years ago.”

This claim is part of Trump’s political narrative about the 2015 nuclear agreement. The United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 during Trump’s first presidency and subsequently reimposed extensive sanctions against Iran.

Now, however, the issue has gone beyond simply reviving a nuclear agreement. Iran’s file in 2026 has become intertwined with matters related to naval blockade, regional security, the Strait of Hormuz, missile capability, and the consequences of war.

Reuters reported in late July that Trump and Netanyahu reviewed all possible paths to contain Iran’s nuclear program and that three options—agreement, economic pressure, and military action—remained on the table. Now the Islamic Republic faces a complex dilemma.

On one hand, accepting negotiations could create the opportunity to reduce sanctions and open some economic pathways; on the other hand, negotiating under blockade and military threat could carry high political costs domestically in Iran.

Conversely, continuing resistance also has its economic costs. The longer the blockade continues, the greater the pressure on Iran’s trade, exports, currency, and financial resources will become.

In such circumstances, Tehran’s decision is not only about a nuclear agreement; it is about whether it is willing to accept some of America’s demands to reduce economic pressure or prefers to bear the costs of continuing confrontation.

The calculation is equally complex in Washington. Prolonged economic pressure could have consequences for the energy market, the regional economy, and even the American economy. The Associated Press pointed to this very issue, writing that continued crisis could also affect the energy market and fuel prices.

Ultimately, what is evident from Trump’s current policy toward Iran is a shift of part of the confrontation from the skies and battlefields to banking networks, foreign trade, oil exports, and foreign currency resources. Trump has kept three options on the table: agreement, economic pressure and blockade, and return to military attack. But under current circumstances, it appears Washington prefers to test the effects of economic pressure before moving toward a broader military option.

For Iran too, the issue is not only foreign sanctions. Internal economic crisis, declining purchasing power, currency depreciation, and structural economic problems have increased the country’s vulnerability to external pressure.

For this reason, perhaps the most important question in the coming months will not be when Trump will attack again; rather, it will be whether economic pressure can bring Tehran and Washington back to the negotiating table, or whether economic blockade will ultimately lead again to military confrontation. The answer to this question could determine the future course of Iran, American policy in the Middle East, and even the global energy market.