“Fake Imamzadehs” and Registration of 11,000 Imamzadehs After the Revolution

After the revolution, the number of imamzadehs in Iran increased sevenfold. This figure, which includes imamzadehs such as Bijan, Ahani, and Zanjiri, has raised concerns for some whether this is a “shop” or, according to the deputy head of the Endowments Organization, a result of more accurate statistics?

Since more than seven years ago, when Hassan Rabiee, spokesperson for the Organization of Endowments and Charitable Affairs, spoke of the sevenfold growth of imamzadehs in Iran in the years following the revolution, this increasing trend continues to this day. In 2011, Rabiee announced the number of officially recognized imamzadehs by the organization to be close to 11,000, saying they were buried in more than 8,000 shrines.

According to officials, the number of imamzadehs in 1978 was around 1,500 shrines, while in just three decades after the revolution, this number increased sevenfold.

Some attribute the unbridled increase in the number of imamzadehs to the misuse of people’s religious sentiments for financial purposes and also as a sign of intensified superstition in Iranian society.

This emerging phenomenon has become so widespread that it has not only opened the door to terms such as “fake imamzadehs,” “unverified imamzadehs,” and “imamzadeh-making,” but has also repeatedly prompted parliamentary representatives to protest. In a report, Khabar Online writes that their investigation shows some parliamentary representatives believe the Endowments Organization has not done much to counter “unverified imamzadehs.”

Mohammad Ali Pourmokhtari, a parliamentary representative, in an interview with Khabar Online, called for “a strong response to the increase in fake imamzadehs.” He says that in this process, money is taken from people and “tens of millions” are spent on shrines. Therefore, the Endowments Organization, which is the main responsible body, should “intervene to prevent this degradation” and not allow “these misuses.”

Khabar Online writes that the Article 90 Commission of parliament addressed this issue years ago and to some extent managed to prevent the spread of imamzadeh-making. However, Gholamali Jafarzadeh Eminabadi, a representative of Rasht in parliament, says this impact has not been significant and “nothing substantial has yet been done to dismantle these imamzadehs.”

Jafarzadeh Eminabadi, disagreeing with some Endowments Organization officials who attribute the statistical discrepancy before and after the revolution to inaccurate pre-1979 statistics, says the statistics of imamzadehs before the revolution “were accurate and this statistical growth has no legal basis.”

According to him, despite the Article 90 Commission’s action, people still tie cloth or locks to certain trees, “while some of these imamzadehs and shrines have no genealogy whatsoever.”

He has asked endowments officials not to allow playing with people’s religious sentiments and not to let recourse to imamzadehs become “a shop for profiteering by a neighborhood council or a village administration.”

“Imamzadeh Bijan, Zanjiri, and Ahani”

Gholamreza Adel, deputy for cultural and social affairs of the Organization of Endowments and Charitable Affairs, told Khabar Online that pre-revolution statistics on imamzadehs were mostly based on “guesswork,” while these statistics are now “accurate and updated.”

He points to the sensationalization of some imamzadeh names in the sphere of satire and says, “People’s misuse of certain titles and terms for imamzadehs … has further contributed to the spread of superstitions in the field of sacred shrines.” According to him, “Imamzadeh Bijan” is actually Imamzadeh Seyyed Mohammad, known as “Bi Jinn,” which is “mistakenly” pronounced as Bijan.

Imamzadeh Seyyed Jalaluddin next to the historic Nasir al-Mulk Mosque in Shiraz became known among people as “Zanjiri” because in the past a chain was attached to its door to which pilgrims would fasten votive offerings. Imamzadeh Mohammad of Mamassani district also became known among people as “Imamzadeh Ahani” due to an iron door installed for it in the past.

One of the Endowments experts denies financial exploitation from imamzadeh-making and in an interview with Khabar Online says: “The income of some of these imamzadehs over three months doesn’t even reach one million tomans. The issue of imamzadehs’ revenue generation has been exaggerated.”

He also, in response to the question of why most imamzadehs are located in northern Iran, says this issue has “historical reasons,” one of which is “the rule of the Alawites in Tabaristan in this region.”

Mahdi Izadi, deputy director of the Cultural Heritage Organization of Mazandaran Province, told Khabar Online that this province has 110 tombs, “some of which also have genealogies.” He emphasizes that this organization does not get involved in whether imamzadehs are genuine or fake, and this responsibility is with the Endowments Organization.

Seven years ago, Masoud Roshan, a cultural heritage expert, in an interview with ILNA news agency, said that only two thousand imamzadehs out of the existing imamzadehs in Iran have documents and genealogies. He put the number of existing imamzadehs in Iran at that time at over 10,000 and said four thousand of this number are attributed to Musa Kadhim, the seventh Imam of Shiites.

According to this expert, the reason why many of these imamzadehs are not actually descendants of the Imams is that during the Arab invasion, people, fearing the destruction of ancient sites or because they had hidden their valuable items there for fear of theft, called these places tombs and attributed them to the Imams and the Prophet.

He also considered the presence of imamzadehs in remote mountains to lack historical documentation and as a sign of “the prevalence of a type of superstition.”

Source: DW